Al-Nu`mani reports that al-Baqir advised his partisan Abu al-Jarud to keep quiet at home, and not to implicate himself in the militant activities of some `Alids against the Umayyads, since the Umayyad state had a natural lifespan and the moment of its downfall had not yet come(1). He added that any `Alid who rebelled against tyranny before the rise of al-Qa’im would inevitably fail(2).

Al-Sadiq and the later Imams followed the same policy. They ordered their followers not to allow despair to find a place in their hearts and to wait for the rise of al-Qa’im in the near future(3). This policy enabled the Imamites to spread their doctrine and at the same time to organize themselves - during the period between 132-260/749-874 - into a well-established political and financial organization (al-Wikala). It seems probable that this underground organization was preparing for the rise of al-Qa’im. For they expected his rising(4) and placed important political and relgious duties upon his shoulders.

Several narrations suggest that the quiescent policy of the Imams was established after their followers caused two abortive rebellions. According to al-Kulayni, al-Sadiq once said:

This matter (al-Amr), that is, the endeavour to reach power, was hidden until it reached the hands of the Kaysaniyya. They revealed it on the roads and circulated it among the villagers of al-Sawad(5).

According to al-Numani the Imamites endeavoured to rise in arms twice, first in the year 70/689 and second in the year 140/758, but their followers spoiled their plans by revealing the name of their leader to their foes(6), an act which resulted in the arrest or the assassination of the Imams. In this connection a conversation between al-Baqir and his partisan `Abd Allah by `Ata al-Wasiti is revealing. Al-Wasiti said to the Imam:

You have many followers in Iraq and there is no one among your family who has the merit for leadership but you. So why do you not rise in arms? Al-Baqir replied: O `Abd Allah, do not listen to the masses, because none of us has his name mentioned by the people nor a hand pointing at him as the Imam, without soon facing inevitable death. So search for him whose birth is concealed from the people, because he will be the one who will manage such an affair.(7)

Moreover al-Sadiq was reported to have said:

This matter (the rising in arms) was vested in me, but Allah delayed it; He shall do with my progeny whatever He wants(8).

These sayings indicate that the Imams had suffered the consequences of revealing the fixed dates of their militant endeavours to reach power. Hence the later Imams did not reveal explicitly to their followers which Imam would be al-Qa’im with the sword. At the same time they encouraged their followers to follow their instructions(9), for this would pave the way for one of the Imams to reach power under the title of al-Qa’im.

Several traditions reveal that the establishment of al-Qa’im's political state will occur through the "natural" course of events. A Prophetic tradition states that a group of people from the east will start underground activities and pave the way for the installation of al-Mahdi by military means(10).

The latter will struggle for power without any miraculous aid and will face difficulties and opposition against the propogation of his teachings, similar to the opposition which the Prophet faced with Quraysh(11). Furthermore he will not take any militant action unless he has at least 10,000 partisans(12).

According to al-Baqir the main goal of al-Qa’im will be to establish an Islamic state and to apply Islamic law as it was revealed to the Prophet. Al-Sadiq asserts that he will follow the Prophet's policy by eliminating and demolishing all the innovations which derive from a situation of ignorance (al-Jahiliyya) and apply Islam in a new form(13).

Other narrations indicate that he will apply the law of David and Solomon along with the Islamic law(14) and apply the rules of the Torah to the Jews and the rules of the Gospel to the Christians. According to al-Nu'mani, his state will include, in addition to the Islamic lands, the territories of Rum, Sind, India and China(15).

Some functions attributed to al-Qa’im indicate the unrest and disappointment felt by the Imamites in the face of the political and economic situation of the time. Al-Fadl b. Shadhan (d. 260/873) and al-Kulayni report that al-Qa’im will rise with the sword as God's avenger against those who caused troubles to `Ali and his wife Fatima. He would also take vengeance against those who were responsible for the suffering of the Imams and their followers(16), particularly against those who assassinated al-Husayn. Al-Sadiq considered al-Husayn's assassination the main reason for the rise of al-Qa’im as an avenger(17).

Other functions of al-Qa’im depict the political annoyance of the Imams towards the allegiance of the Arabs, and especially towards the clan of Quraysh who had monopolized political authority since the death of the Prophet. Al ­Nu`mani mentions a tradition attributed to Imam al-Sadiq: "When al-Qa’im rises he will deal with the Arabs and Quraysh only by the sword(18).

The Imamites also vested al-Qa’im with another task which reveals their dissatisfaction with the economic system of the `Abbasid state. According to al-Himyari, al-Baqir stated that when al-Qa’im rose allthe feudal systems would be abolished(19).

Al-Kulayni agrees with al­ Himyari and adds that al-Qa’im, after carrying out this operation, may allow his partisans to administer and cultivate the lands with the condition that they pay the legal land-tax(20).

In the light of these hopes and the repeated failure of the Zaydite uprisings, as had been expected by the Imams, the Imamites concentrated all their hopes on the uprising of al-Qa’im, whose state had been awaited since the time of al-Baqir(21). Al-Nu`mani reports that when tie `Abbasid revolution broke out in Khurasan and black baners were raised, Abu Bakr al-Hadrami and Abban went to the Imam al-Sadiq, and asked his opinion about participating in the revolution. He warned them against it saying: "When you see us follow a man, then you must join us with weapons."(22)

Although the Imam did not reveal the identity of the man to be followed, he confirmed that he would struggle for power by militant means and eliminate the rule of his opponents(23).

It appears that because of the militant role of al-Qa’im the Imams refrained from giving any explicit statement of his identity. However, they did indicate that since the rulers, first the Umayyads and then the `Abbasids, had reached power by "natural" means, their fall would also occur by "natural" means.

There is a good deal of evidence to indicate that some of the Imams would have taken militant action if they had had strong and faithful partisans. But they delayed this task indefinitely until the intellectual activites of their followers could bear fruit and be converted into a political awareness which might enable one of the Imams to gain power by militant means.

The Imams also wanted their partisans to be more optimistic in gaining immediate success, and not to leave the task of propagation of their teachings to al-Qa’im, whose military uprising relied on the outcome of the activities of the Imamites themselves. Finally, it seems most likely that the uprising of the Imam who would be al-Qa’im, was later attributed to the Twelfth Imam, because the Imamite propaganda reached a developed, political stage during the life-time of the Tenth and the eleventh Imams, and this might have enabled the Twelfth Imam to reach power.

3.4.3 The signs of the rise of al-Qa’im

The early Imamite traditionists delineated five signs which would precede the rise of al-Qa’im al-Mahdi: first, the rise of al-Yamani, then the rise of al-Sufyani, thirdly the assassination of the Pure Soul (al-Nafs al-Zakiyya) in Mecca only fifteen days before the rise of al­Qa'im, fourthly an outcry in the morning from the sky in the name of al-Qa’im, and finally the sinking of an army into the earth (al-Bayda') during its march on Mecca(24). Despite the fact that al-Nu`mani, al-Saduq and al-Tusi differ as to the chronological occurrence of these signs, they all agree that they will occur in the same year(25).

It seems that the delineation of these signs along with the expectations of the Imamites and al-Jarudiyya that al-Qa’im al ­Mahdi would rise in the near future(26) caused the `Abbasid authorities to be suspicious, since some of these signs were connected with their regime and indicated that al-Qa’im's uprising was directed mainly against them. The fact that the Imams had the `Abbasids in mind can be seen in the discussion between al-Riďa, the eighth Imam, and his adherent al-Hasan b. al-Jahm(27), who said to him:

"May Allah make you prosper! The people are saying that al­ Sufyani will rise after the fall of the `Abbasids." Al-Riďa said: "They lie. He will rise while they are still in power.(28)

This statement has been confirmed in other traditions attributed to al-Sadiq. For example his companion Ya`qub b. al-Sarraj asked him:

"When will your Shi'a gain their release from suffering?" He replied, "When conflict occurs amongst the `Abbasids, and their power begins to decline. Then their partisans and their subjects will be encouraged to threaten the authorities. There­after al-Sufyani will rise from the West, while the Yamani will advance from the East, until they both reach Kufa, where they will destroy the `Abbasids. At the same time the Hasani will start his rebellion. Then the Master of this matter, al-Qa’im, shall advance from Medina towards Mecca to rebel.(29) "

According to al-Nu`mani, al-Sadiq added that because of these events, the fall of the `Abbasid regime was inevitable. Its fall would be similar to a piece of crockery dropped from the hand of its possessor, which then splits into pieces."(30)

In the light of these statements attributed to the Imams it is clear that from the time of al-Sadiq onwards, the Imamites awaited the political uprising of one of their Imams, called al-Qa’im while the `Abbasids were still in power(31).

Indeed the spread of these traditions caused the `Abbasids to fear the Imams, who might have been behind some `Alid revolts. Perhaps this is why the `Abbasid caliphs became suspicious of the Imams. Even the caliph al-Mansur himself related a tradition on the authority of al-Baqir stating that al-Qa’im would be from the progeny of 'Ali(32).

 He restricted the movements of al-Sadiq and his followers and made it a policy to discriminate against them. Moreover he invested his sucessor Muhammad with the epithet "al­Mahdi" (158-169/775-785) in order to turn the attention of his subjects from the `Alid family toward the family of `Abbas(33).

Despite the fact that the movements of the seventh Imam, Musa al-­Kazim, were also restricted by the authorities, so that he died in prison(34),  the Shi’ite propaganda for the rise of an Imam in the name of al-Qa’im and al-Mahdi spread on a wide scale, particularly after the rebellion of Ibn Tabataba in 199/814.

Probably because of this situation the caliph al-Ma’mun devised a new policy towards the eighth Imam al-Riďa. He made overtures to him asking him to be his heir apparent. By this means he hoped to split the `Alids some of whom were in rebellion and to keep al-Riďa within the `Abbasid palace under close watch(35).

 

 

 


 


(1)See Chapter II.

(2)N. al-Ghayba, 104, 107, 159; al-Hadrami, op. cit., f. 48a; al-Kafi, VIII, 264

(3)N. al-Ghayba, 106-7; al-Kafi, VIII, 264, 310.

(4)N. al-Ghayba, 94, 96.

(5)al-Kafi, II, 223.

(6)N. al-Ghayba, 158

(7)al-Kafi, I, 342; Kama’l, 325.

(8)T. al-Ghayba, 278.

(9)al-Kafi, I, 368-9; Bihar, LII, 212.

(10) Ibn Maja, Sunan, II, 1366; al-Kanji, op. cit., 314.

(11) al-Kafi VIII, 225; N. al- Ghayba, 106, 160; al-Tabsi quotes a statement from Ibn A'tham attributed to `Ali which states that the partisans of al-Mahdi will start their activities from al-Talqan in Khurasan; al-Shi`a wa-l-Raj a, 141.

(12) Kama’l, 654

(13) N. al-Ghayba, 104,122,123. Al-Saffar reports that al-Qa’im will apply Islamic law according to the books of `Ali which he related directly from the Prophet; Basa'ir al-Darajat, f. 124.

(14) al-Saffar, op. cit., f. 50; al-Kafi, I, 298.

(15) N. al-Ghayba, 124, 125-6; al-Tabsi, op. cit., 218; `Ali b. Tawus, al-Malahim wa-l Fitan (Najaf, 1367), 53; Najm al-Din al-`Askari, al-Mahdi al-Maw`ud al­ Muntazar (Beirut, 1977), II, 10.

(16) Ibn Shadhan, Ithbat al-Raja, quoted by al-Tabsi, op. cit., 221; al-Kafi, VIII, 233; al-Saduq. `Ilal, II, 267; al-Majlisi includes in his work al-Bihar a book attributed to al-Mufaddil b. `Umar which deals with the occurrence which will take place after the rise of al-Qa’im; Bihar, LIII, 1-38; Dala'il, 239, 260; N. al­ Ghayba, 148.

(17) al-Kafi I, 465; al-Tusi, al-Amali, II, 33; al-Saduq, `Ilal, 229; Ibn Tawus, al­ Iqbal, 186.

(18) N. al-Ghayba, (the second editon), 308, 319.

(19) al-Himyari, op. cit., quoted by al-Galbagani, op. cit., 305.

(20) al-Kafi, I, 407-8.

(21) N. al-Ghayba, 103.

(22) N. al-Ghayba, 105

(23) al-Kafi, I, 240, 281, 370-2. Di`bil the poet recited a line of poetry concerning the militant role of al-Qa’im in the presence of al-Riďa; the latter confirmed this by saying that al-Qa’im would be from the progeny of al-Husayn. Di`bil, Diwan. 73,76;  Kama’l, 327-4.

(24) N. al-Ghayba, 134, 139-40; Kama’l, 649; T. al-Ghayba, 286; al-Kafi, VIII, 225, 310.

(25) N. al-Ghayba, 136; T. al-Ghayba, 286; Bihar, LII, 232.

(26) N. al-Ghayba, 94.

(27) For his biography, see Ibn Dawud, Kitab al-Rijal, 104.

(28) N. al-Ghayba, 163-4.

(29) N. al-Ghayba, 135, 138, 144-5; al-Kafi, VIII, 224-5.

(30) N. al-Ghayba, 137; Bihar, LII, 232.

(31) al-Hadrami,Kitab Ja’far b. Shurayh, f. 39.

(32) al-Kafi, VIII, 209-210; al-Irshad, 404.

(33) It is reported that the Prophet said, "The Mahdi is from my progeny. His name is similar to mine" (al-Tirmidhi'. IV, 505). According to Abu Dawud, the Prophet also added, "And his father's name is similar to my father's name" (Abu Dawud, al-Sunan, IV, 106-7). According to the last phrase the name of al­-Mahdi is Muhammad b. `Abd Allah. Perhaps al-Mansur took this point into account when he called his son, "Muhammad al-Mahdi" (al-Bidaya, X, 89). For a full account see Osman, op. cit., 266-9.

(34) See Chapter II.

(35) Ithbat, 205.