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However, it seems that the Saf’ir's network was so strong and worked so
efficiently that his agents from near and far knew at
once that the caliph and his vizier planned to act
against them. Before the plan to arrest the agents of
the Imam could be executed an order to stop the
collection of taxes had gone out to almost every agent.
When a spy infiltrated as far as the main agent in
Baghdad, Muhammad alQattan, and informed him that he
had money and wanted to send it to the Imam, al‑Qattan
pretended that he knew nothing about this matter. The
other agents acted similarly(1).
It appears that the caliph failed to obtain any information from his
spies. Therefore he decided to try to gather information
by arresting the Imamites who came to visit the tomb of
al‑Hir, where al‑Husayn was buried, and the tombs of
Quraysh, where the seventh and the ninth Imams were
buried. However, according to the Imamite sources, this
plan was revealed to the Imamites, and an order was sent
out to both the families of Banu Furat and al‑Barsiyyin,
warning them not to visit the tombs of Quraysh in
Baghdad."(2)
According to al‑Rawandi, a report came to the caliph revealing that the
Twelfth Imam was staying in the house of his father in
Sdmarra. The caliph did not want knowledge of his
information to reach the hands of the Imamites, so he
himself dispatched three of his personal soldiers to
Samarra. He described the house of al‑ `Askari to them
and commanded them to enter it and kill whomever they
found inside, but he did not reveal to them the name of
the person whom they were going to murder. However, the
Twelfth Imam managed to evade the soldiers, and they
returned to the capital(3).
The hostile 'Abbasid attitude towards the agents of the second Saf’ir
continued after `Ubayd Allah b. Sulayman's death in
288/900. His office was given to his son al‑Qasim. The
latter was well‑known in his hatred toward the Imamites
and the Shiites in general. Throughout his service in
office he followed the same policies of his father
towards the Imamites and showed more malevolence.
Al‑Tusi gives a report supporting this point: Muhammad
b. `Abd Allah of Qumm, who had seen the Imam and had
obvious Imamite inclinations, attracted the attention of
the vizier al‑Qasim b. `Ubayd Allah. On several
occasions he tried to murder him, so he finally fled to
Egypt(4).
According to Ibn al‑Jawzi, al‑Qasim arrested many innocent `Alids on the
pretext that they had Qarmatian inclinations, and they
remained in jail until 291/903.(5)
The continual campaigns of arrest carried out by the `Abbasids and the
ill‑effects of the Qaramita uprisings made the Imam and
his agents even more careful. According to Abu Sahl
al‑Nawbakhti the correspondence between the Imam and the
Saf’irstopped about this time(6),
probably in order to erase any traces which might lead
the authorities to them. As another precautionary
measure from the reign of al‑Mu'tadid onwards the Imam
changed his place of residence several times. Reports
mentioned by al‑Tusi indicate that, in an unspecified
year, a certain agent told Abu Sawra that he was going
to the Maghrib to meet the Imam. Someone else saw him in
Syria and another met him in Egypt(7).
Yet another report states that the 'Imam was resident in the mountains
near Mecca about the year 293/905.(8)
According to the second Saf’ir, the Imam used to perform
the pilgrimage every year(9).
All these narrations would seem to indicate that the
Imam did not stay in one place for more than a short
time, perhaps fearing that the authorities would
discover his identity and plot against his life.
3.3) The Qaramita's use of the Prophetic traditions predicting the rise
of al-Qa’im al‑Mahdi in their struggle to gain immediate
political success may have made the Imamites give
greater emphasis to the physical signs which would
precede the rise of al-Qa’im as mentioned in the
Prophetic traditions and the statements of the Imams.
Al-Kulayni, who was a contemporary to the second Saf’ir,
and his student al‑Nu'mani narrate, as has been
mentioned before, five signs which must precede the rise
of the real al-Qa’im al‑Mahdi:
(1) al‑Sufyani will rise in Syria and dominate it for only nine months.
(2) At the same time a rebel called al‑Yamani (al‑Qahtani)(10)
will start a rebellion and advance towards Mecca.
(3) Afterwards the pure soul, a descendant of al‑Hasan, will revolt in
Medina. Its inhabitants will kill him and send his head
to al‑Sufyani.
(4) He will dispatch an army against Medina, but God will cause it to
sink into the ground in the vicinity of the city.
(5) Thereupon in the morning an outcry in the sky will announce the full
name of al-Qa’im al‑Mahdi, who accordingly will rise in
Mecca. These events will take place consecutively within
one year.(11)
It is clear from the Imamite presentation of these signs that they
considered them a refutation of the claims of the
Isma'ili leader who called himself al‑Mahdi after his
rising in 296/908.(12)
The emphasis which was given to these signs served to prevent the
ordinary Imamites from involving themselves in Shiite
activities with which the Imamite organization
(al‑Wikala) was not involved. This view is confirmed by
the fact that around this period many traditions were
being related and attributed to the previous Imams
warning the Imamites not to participate in any
revolution before the rise of al-Qa’im(13).
The circulation of these traditions led people to feel that they should
live peaceably and not involve themselves in any
activities which might lead to revolution. This
conclusion along with the five signs of the rise of
al-Qa’im, encouraged some Imamites to put forward the
idea that the establishment of the state of the People
of the House (Ahl al‑Bayt) is the responsibility of
al-Qa’im himself and that any militant decision must be
delayed until the rise of al-Qa’im.
In fact these traditions were intended as warnings against taking part in
militant activities led by false claimants. But because
of the way people interpreted them, very little
attention was given to the traditions which encouraged
the people to prepare for the rise of the Twelfth Imam
after his occultation. It is reported that the tenth
Imam said,
"If your Imam goes into occultation, expect freedom from grief (to come
from) beneath your feet."(14)
It is clear that the above statement of al‑Hadi meant that it is the
responsibility of every follower of the hidden Imam to
prepare for the rise of their Imam by their own efforts.
It is most likely that this quiescent approach was encouraged by the
Imamite scholars, whose role increased during the time
of the second Saf’ir(15).
These people trained the ordinary Imamites to follow the
instructions of the narrators during the occultation of
the Imam. They were aided in achieving this aim by a
statement attributed to the Twelfth Imam:
"Concerning the occurrences which will happen, consult the narrators of
our traditions, because they are my proof towards you,
and I am the Proof of Allah.”(16)
It appears that by such methods the Imamite narrators were able to
prevent the Imamite masses from taking part in the
militant activities of the Qaramita. However, this
quiescent attitude, which was only a precautionary
measure taken against the Isma'ilis, developed later
into the fundamental approach towards the question of
the rise of al-Qa’im.
4. The Death of Abu Ja’far
It is reported that the second Saf’ir prophesied the time of his death
and prepared his own gravestone upon which Qur'anic
verses and the names of the Imams were inscribed. He
died in 305/917(17)
and was buried in his house on the road leading to Kufa,
on the western side of Baghdad(18).
Chapter 6:
The Career of the Third Saf’ir, al-Nawabakhti
1. Al‑Nawbakhti’s Activities During the Time of the Second Saf’ir
The third Saf’irwas Abu al‑Qasim al‑Husayn b. Ruh b. Abi Bahr
al-Nawbakhti. He remained in the office in the years
305‑326/917‑937, although the date of his birth is not
known. According to Ibn Shahr Ashub, al‑Nawbakhti was a
close associate of the eleventh Imam, al`Askari, and
was his Gate (Bab)(19),
but it is difficult to accept such a report because
al‑`Askari died in 260/874 and al‑Nawbakhti died in
326/937.
There are several reports indicating that al‑Nawbakhti was a native of
the traditional Shiite city of Qumm. Al‑Kashshi and
Yahya b. Abi Tayy (d. 630/1232) called him al‑Qummi(20).
Moreover al‑Nawbakhti was fluent in the Persian dialect of the people of
Abah, one of the suburbs of Qumm(21),
and this suggests that he belonged to the branch of Banu
Nawbakht resident in Qumm. However, he had emigrated to
Baghdad during the time of the first Saf’ir. According
to al‑Tusi, he was brought up in Baghdad under the
guardianship of Muhammad b. `Ali Bilal,(22)
who later denied that Abu Ja`far al‑`Umari was. the
second Saf’irof the Twelfth Imam. Al‑Nawbakhti joined
the service of the second Saf’irand became his agent
(wakil). Despite his youth al-Nawbakhti was
distinguished by his shrewdness, particularly in his
relations with opponents(23).
Perhaps it was this quality which enabled him to climb quickly in the
ranks of the organization.
Al‑Nawbakhti spent several years working as an agent for the second
Saf’ir, who used to pay him a salary of 30 dinars a
month. He also received financial support from high
Shiite officials and viziers like Banu Furat. The second
Saf’iremployed him to look after his properties and made
him the connecting link between himself and the other
leaders of the Imamites(24).
According to al‑Tusi, al‑Nawbakhti was the intermediary between the
second Saf’ir and the two agents of Kufa, al‑Zajawzji
and Abu Ghalib al‑Zurari(25).
His service in the Wikala helped him in contacting high
Shi’ite officials of the `Abbasid administration,
particularly his relatives Banu Nawbakht and also Banu
Furat(26).
By the year 298/910 he had become highly respected by the people. At
that time an interesting occurrence took place which
reveals his importance. Al‑Saduq narrates that an `Alid
called al-`Aqiqi went to visit the vizier 'Ali b. `Isa
al‑Jarrah asking him to solve his financial problems,
but the vizier would not listen to him. Therefore
al‑Nawbakhti sent a message to al‑`Aqiqi and solved his
difficulties(27).
This narration gives some indication of the social position of
al‑Nawbakhti while he was still an agent of the second
Saf’ir.
2. The Installation of the Third Saf’ir
As we have already seen, (106‑7) the ten eminent agents in Baghdad
expected that Ja’far. b. Ahmad b. Matil would take over
the office of the second Saf’ir when he died. But on his
death bed, when the agents were all gathered together,
he appointed Ibn Ruh al‑Nawbakhti, saying that the
Twelfth Imam had ordered him to do so(28).
At that time the Imamites put forward different reasons for the
designation of Ibn Ruh al‑Nawbakhti. Umm Kulthum, the
daughter of the second Saf’ir , thought that Ibn Ruh was
promoted to the office of the deputyship (sifara)
because of his close relationship with her father. She
reports that her father even used to reveal to him what
had occurred between himself and his slave‑girls(29).
However, according to the agent Ibn Qurd, the other nine agents in
Baghdad, especially Ibn Matil, were closer to the second
Saf’ir than Ibn Ruh(30).
It seems most likely that Ibn Ruh had personal qualifications which made
him a suitable Saf’ir. Indeed we have a report
attributed to Abu Sahl al Nawbakhti to support this
point. The latter was asked by some Imamites as to why
he had not been promoted to the sifara instead of Ibn
Ruh. He answered,
"They (the Imams) know best about whom they have selected for this
office. I am a person who meets opponents and argues
with them. If I had known what Abu al‑Qasim (Ibn Ruh)
knows about the Imam, perhaps in the course of my
arguments, having found myself under the attack of
enemies to give them wellfounded reasons for the
existence of the concealed Imam, I would have pointed
out his whereabouts. But if Abu al‑Qasim had the Imam
underneath his garments, and if his flesh was being cut
into pieces to make him reveal his whereabouts, he would
not yield or reveal his presence to his foes."
(31)
This document indicates that Ibn Ruh was promoted to the sifara mainly
because of his loyalty and the shrewdness which he had
shown on several occasions. Therefore we cannot accept
the opinion of Sachedina, who thinks that the
appointment of Ibn Ruh as Saf’ir to the Twelfth Imam,
"must have been influenced by another eminent member of
the Nawbakht family, namely Abu Sahl Isma`il b. `Ali. He
was one of those leading Imamites, who were present in
the last days of the second agent to bear witness to the
designation of Abu alQasim as the agent."(32)
(2)al-Kafi,I,525;
al-Irshad,402; T. al-Ghayba,183-4. This order is
believed to have come from the Imam himself.
(3)al-Rawandi, al-Khara'ij
wa-l-Jara'ih (Bombay, 1301), 67. Al-Tusi
mentions the names of two of the three soldiers:
Ahmad b. `Abd Allah and Rashiq, the servant of
al-Mu`tadid. It appears that al-Tusi's report is
sound, because al-Tabari confirms that Rashiq
was the personal soldier (ghulam, khadim) of
al-Mu`tadid and took part in the fighting
against the Zanj revolution; Tabari III,1953,
2003, 2007, 2017-9, 2082-3; T. al-Ghayba,160-1.
(5)Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam,
VI,46.
(6)Kama’l,92-3, quoted from
Kitab al-Tanbih by Abu Sahl al-Nawbakhti.
(7)T. al-Ghayba,166, 195-6.
(8)T. al-Ghayba,166, 165.
(10)The Prophet's companion
`Abd Allah b. `Amr b. al-As used to narrate a
Prophetic tradition predicting the rise of
al-Qahtani, whose rising is only a sign for the
rise of al-Qa’im al-Mahdi. However, Mu'awiya
prohibited this companion from narrating the
tradition, because he thought that the spread of
such traditions would encourage the people to
overthrow him; B. Sahih,384.
(11)al-Kafi,VIII,209, 264,
265, 274, 310, 331; from 273/886 onward 'Ali b.
al-Husayn al-Taymali used to narrate other signs
of al-Qa’im's uprising (N. al-Ghayba,131, 164;
Kama’l,649-656; al-Hadrami, Asl Ja`far b.
Shurayh al Hadrami, f. 37a, 39a, 48a.
(13)Al-Nu'mani devotes a
section of his work al-Ghayba to the refutation
of the claims of the Isma`ilis (N.
al-Ghayba,53-7, 176-80); al-Kulayni reports a
narration on the authority of al-Sadiq,
forbidding his follower `Umar b. Hanzala from
taking part in any `Alid revolution before the
outcry in the sky; al-Kafi,VIII,310. See also
Ikhtiyar,262-3.
(15)For a full account of the
increase of the role of the Imamite fuqaha', see
Chapter VII.
(17)Al-Tusi gives two dates
for the death of Abu Ja`far, the first of which,
304/916, is on the authority of the grandson of
Abu Ja`far, Hibat Allah. The second report
attributed to Abu Ghalib al-Zurari, the agent of
Ibn Ruh in Kufa puts the date at 305/917.
Because the latter had close relations with Abu
Ja`far and was his contemporary, it seems that
his report is more likely to be accurate; T. al-Ghayba,
238-9; al-Kamil, VIII, 80; Abu al-Fida,
al-Mukhtasar,II,69.
(18)T. al-Ghayba,238-9. On the
eastern side of Baghdad there is a tomb situated
in a mosque called al-Khullani. The people
believe that it is the grave of Abu Ja’far.
Since al-Tusi mentions that his grave is on the
western side it is possible that his corpse was
transported to the new grave, but there is no
available source to support such a claim.
(19)Ibn Sahr Ashub, Manaqib,
I, 458.
(20)Ikhtiyar, 557. The work of
Ibn Abi Tayy is not extant, but al‑Dhahabi used
it in writing al‑Nawbakhti's biography; al‑Dhahabi,
Tarikh al‑Islam, f. 132.
(21)T. al-Ghayba, 209‑10;
Iqbal, Khandan Nawbakhti, 214.
(22)T. al-Ghayba, 252‑253.
(23)T. al-Ghayba, 250- 252.
(24)T. al-Ghayba, 242‑3;
Bihar, LI, 355.
(25)The narrator of this
report is Abu Ghalib al‑Zurari. He reports that
he used to contact the second Safi’r via al‑Nawbakhti,
who when he became the third Safi’r, contacted
the agents of Kufa through al‑Shalmaghani; T.
al-Ghayba, 202.
(28)The testament of the
second safi’r to Ibn Ruh al‑Nawbakhti was
reported on the authority of the agents,
Muhammad b. Humam and Ja`far b. Ahmad b. Matil,
who were present at that meeting and bore
witness to the designation. Moreover Ibn Barina,
the grandson of the second Safi’r, also reports
the testament and agrees with the other agents
in regard to its authenticity. Kama’l, 503.
(32)Sachedina, The Doctrine of
Mahdism in Imami Shi'ism (Ph.D.) Thesis, Toronto
University (Canada, 1976), 137.
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