They considered it a sort of wrong analogy (qiyas fasid) similar to that
which was established and implemented by non-shi'ite
jurists.
The prolongation of the Twelfth Imam's concealment, which was attacked by
Zaydite scholars and others, led the Imamite jurists to
introduce rational arguments in order to defend their
belief in the existence of the Twelfth Imam(1)
Men who had been mere narrators of traditions became scholastic
theologians (Mutakallimun). This change in the role of
the Fuqaha' can be seen in al-Mufid's works. His works
mark a break with earlier Imamite writing like al-Saffar
and alュKulayni's works which are purely collections of
traditions, whereas al-Mufid's are mainly treatises
written in defence of the Imamite doctrine, in
particular, the belief in the Twelfth Imam's
occultation.
Al-Mufid also was a narrator of traditions (Muhaddith),but since he gave
priority to the theological issues he was named the
speaker of the Shiites (Mutakallim al-Shi'a). Moreover
with the passing of time new situations arose to which
the shari`a had to be applied, and since direct
communication with the Twelfth Imam had come to an end,
someone had to be found to give an answer to these
questions. Thus the Imamite Fuqaha' expanded their role
by undertaking Ijtihad(2)
to answer such questions and to fill the vacuum which
had been brought about by the concealment of the Twelfth
Imam. Al-Mufid may have been the first jurist to
practice Ijtihad. Then al-Tusi (d.460/1067) gave a
definite shape to it.(3)
Secondly, in light of the first point it is clear that during the last
quarter of the fourth/tenth century the Imamite Fuqaha'
acquired authority to give legal judgements (fatwa) to a
much greater extent than those who had been contemporary
with the beginning of the second occultation and the
dissolution of the underground organization. It has
already been noted that after the death of alュSammari in
329/941 the Imamite agents and such fuqaha' as Muhammad
b. Ahmad b. al-Walid were expecting the Imam's
reappearance with the sword in the near future, and for
this reason they refused to receive any of the khums
supposing that it was forbidden for them to do so.(4)
But ever since the time of al-Mufid the fuqaha' have granted themselves
authority to receive the sadat share of the khums in
order to distribute it amongst the needy of the
Prophet's kindred. Since nothing was stipulated
concerning the direct deputyship of the Twelfth Imam(5),
the Imamite fuqaha' gradually gained enough authority to
act as his indirect representatives. They based their
new position on traditions which lay down the role they
were to have while the Imam was in hiding. Below are the
main traditions which have been used in supporting the
authority of the fuqaha':
i) The Twelfth Imam issued a pronouncement (Tawqi) in reply to Ishaq b.
Ya`qub via his second Saf段r:
As for the events which will occur, turn to the narrators of our
traditions, because they (the narrators) are my proof to
you, while I am the proof of Allah to them.(6)
ii) Al-Tabarsi mentions this tradition attributed to the eleventh Imam:
It is obligatory for the populace to follow the jurist who refrains from
committing wrong, mentions his faith, opposes carnal
desire, and obeys Allah's command.(7)
iii) Al-Tabarsi reports another transmission on the authority of the
tenth Imam concerning the role of the fuqaha':
After the occultation of your Qa'im a group of the `ulama' will call
people to believe in his (al-Qa段m's) Imamate and defend
his religion by using proofs sent by Allah, so that they
might save the weak-minded faithful from either the
deceptions of Satan and his followers, or the deceptions
of the anti-`Alids (al-ュNawasib). If none of these `
ulama' remain, then everyone will stray from the
religion of Allah. However, as the pilot holds the
rudder of the ship, the `ulama' will hold firmly onto
the hearts of the weak-minded Shiites, preventing them
from straying. Those 爽lama' are the most excellent in
the view of Allah the Exalted.(8)
It is clear from the above traditions that the fuqaha' must possess two
qualities before they can acquire the right to be the
deputies of the Imam without direct stipulation. Firstly
they should be knowledgeュable in the law. Secondly they
should be just. Then, irrespective of their family,
whether they are from the progeny of al-Husayn or not,
they are entitled to be deputies. It is worth repeating
that the four Saf段rsof the Twelfth Imam were not
descendants of `Ali. This may indicate that the Twelfth
Imam wanted to train and raise his followers to accept,
after his complete occultation, the leadership of the
just and knowledgeable fuqaha',even if they were not
`Alids. Moreover, it can be noted that after the
beginning of the complete occultation, the majority of
able fuqaha' were not from the progeny of `Ali. Among
such fuqaha' were al-Nu'mani (d. 360/970), al-Saduq (d.
381/991), al-Mufid (d. 413/1022).
In short the authority of the fuqaha' became so well-established amongst
the Imamites that a considerable number of the later
fuqaha',such as al-Muhaqqiq al-Hilli (d. 676/1277)
granted the faqih complete authority over the deputyship
of the hidden Imam.(9)
He gave himself as a faqih the right to deal with the Imam's share of
the khums while the early fuqaha' like al-Mufid only
gave themselves authority over the part of the khums
(sadat share) intended for the orphans, the poor, and
the penniless travellers of the Prophet's kindred.
Al-Hilli argues that if the first half of the khums (the
Imam's share) is obligatory, then it must be distributed
even during the Imam's occultation, because that which
,Allah has made obligatory cannot be abrogated on
account of the occultation of the Imam. He continues to
assert that the one who is charged with distributing the
share of the Imam according to the needs of the
Prophet's kindred must hold the deputyship of the Imam
in legal matters i.e. that he must be one of the just
Imamite fuqaha'.(10)
The extension of the authority of the Imamite fuqaha' as a result of the
prolongation of the Imam's occultation was a positive
factor contributing to the unity of the Imamite
community. It has been noted that after the death of
each Imam, the Imamites split into various factions.
This trend reached its peak on the death of the eleventh
Imam in 260/874, when his followers divided into
fourteen groups. But after the occultation of the
Twelfth Imam, the fuqaha' became united in their attempt
to establish their own religious and political
authority.
The force which united them was the belief in the Imamate of the
concealed Imam. As a result, Shi`ism was saved from
splitting into further factions. Consequently, the
number of its followers increased. The death of a faqih
who believed in the Imamate of the hidden Imam did not
lead to a split amongst the faqih's followers, and they
usually accepted the leadership of another Imamite
faqih. Thus all the fourteen factions which had grown up
among the followers of al-`Askari disappeared around the
year 373/983 except for the one group which supported
the Imamate of the Twelfth Imam, who was in a state of
complete occultation.(11)
Chapter 8:
Conclusion
The conclusion of the present work can be summarized as follows:
i) The problem of the nature of the Ghayba of the Twelfth Imam is an old
one in the history of Shi'ism and is closely connected
with the question of the Imama. From the beginning the
Shiites held that the Prophet could not have left his
community without a leader to supervise the
interpretation of the shari`a and its implementation in
society. On the contrary, he had appointed `Ali as his
successor and stipulated that the leadership of the
community should pass to alュ-Hasan and al‑Husayn, and
thereafter to the eldest son of each subsequent Imam
from the line of al‑Husayn until the rise of alュMahdi.
However, the Imams were unable to rule the whole community after the
death of the Prophet. Since political power had been
usurped by others, the Imams were forced to seek to
regain it according to those methods which they felt to
be sound and legal, even though the political and
economic resources of their opponents were stronger than
their own, especially after the martyrdom of al‑Husayn.
None of the Imams after al‑Husayn involved themselves
directly in any obvious political activities or took
part in direct incitement to revolt. In fact it seems
that they restricted their activities to three major
areas:
A) They encouraged the dissemination of Prophetic traditions amongst the
people to acquaint them with the right of the People of
the House of the Prophet (Ahl al‑Bayt) to lead the
community and to show them that their exclusion from
actual political leadership did not mean that they were
content to adopt a purely spiritual stance, nor did it
imply tacit support of the government of the day. Indeed
they were totally committed to their struggle to regain
control, but only when circumstances indicated the
probable success of their rebellion, and when they were
sure of the support of a sufficient number of faithful
followers to aid the revolution and to implement Islam
according to the Imamite approach.
B) From the Imamate of al‑Sadiq the Imams circulated Prophetic Hadith
amongst the Imamites themselves concerning the rise of
an Imam from Ahl al‑Bayt who would establish the
righteous state. This Imam would be al-Qa段m al‑Mahdi,
who was mentioned in the Prophetic traditions. He would
first go into a state of concealment from which he would
continue to direct the affairs of the Imama. Then he
would go into total occultation. But the majority of the
traditions did not specify which Imam this would be, nor
did they stipulate a definite date for his uprising.
This obscurity allowed some `Alids to use these
traditions to support their own political aims, without
heeding the instructions of the Imam as regards the
correct circumstances for the concealment and rising of
al-Qa段m al‑Mahdi. A clear example of this is seen in
the case of the Isma`ilis, who broke away from the
Imamites and continued to carry out their activities
secretly between the years 145‑296/762‑908, until one of
them managed to reach power in the year 296/908,
claiming the title al-ュMahdi.
The Zaydites also used these traditions in their attempts to gain
control, but lacked the precaution and careful planning
of the Isma段lls and the Imamites. In fact the obscurity
of these Hadiths, related from al‑Sadiq was one of the
reasons that some Imamites believed that the concealed
Imam was Musa al‑Kazim, who would rise as al-Qa段m
al‑Mahdi These people were called the Waqifa.
C) The early Imams believed that any of them could be al-Qa段m al‑Mahdi
if the conditions were right but after the failure of
their intended revolt in 140/757, they decided that it
would be illュadvised to fix a particular date for
another uprising. In this way the Imams hoped to
encourage their followers in religious activities which
would pave the way for more political matters at the
appropriate time. At the same time they also secretly
encouraged their most faithful followers, who found that
they had no option but to rebel against unjust and
tyrannical rulers. One of the results of these policies
was the establishment of the Wikala during the Imamate
of al‑Sadiq as a means of supervising the activities of
the Imamites and guiding them towards the final aim of
the Imams, namely the establishment of a truly Islamic
state based entirely upon the shari`a as interpreted and
implemented by the Prophet and his Household.
D) The `Abbasid authorities were aware of the danger posed by the Shiites
and especially by the Imamites. So they tried to turn
the attention of the people away from the rights of Ahl
al‑Bayt (the People of the House) by fabricating
Prophetic traditions which stated that the Imam after
the Prophet was al‑'Abbas and not 'Ali. Simultaneously,
they worked to divide the Shiites internally by
appointing men from the Jaririyya to certain sensitive
posts, so that the Jaririyya could investigate the
Imamites and spread propaganda against them. After the
failure of this policy, from the time of al-ュMa'mun the
`Abbasids instituted a new plan which was intended to
curtail the revolutionary activities of the Shiites.
Part of this plan was to make the Imams their courtiers
so that they could watch their every move. This can be
observed in the policy of al‑Ma'mun, who brought al‑Riďa
from Medina to Merv and appointed him his heir apparent,
keeping him under house arrest. Al‑Ma'mun followed a
similar policy with the ninth Imam al‑Jawad. Later the
`Abbasid caliphs followed al‑Ma'mun's lead in their
attitude towards the tenth Imam, al‑Hadi, and his son
al‑`Askari, both of whom were kept under house arrest in
Samarra for most of their lives. It thus became
extremely difficult for the Imams to have normal
relations with their followers, except their closest
associates with whom they held secret meetings.
It seems likely that the house arrest of
the later Imams led them to expand the role of the
organization, the Wikala, and to entrust the Saf段r with
more authority to supervise the Imamites' activities.
From the time of al‑Jawad onwards, the Imam began to
guide the activities of his followers through his
Saf段r. The ordinary Imamites found such a situation
strange and had to be educated to accept such indirect
communication with the Imam. However the role of the
Saf段r during this period is not as obvious as his later
position during the first occultation of the Twelfth
Imam, because the Imam's whereabouts were well‑known and
his position clear.
(1)al-Sahib b. `Abbad, op.
cit.,211.
(2)Ijtihad, in Sunni law means
the pronouncing of independent judgements on
legal or theological questions based on the
interpretation and application of the four
principles, the Qur'an, traditions, consensus,
and reason (Aql). According to the
Imamites,Ijtihad is employing all one's power to
arrive at speculative probability (zann) in a
case or in a rule of divine law depending mainly
on the Qur'an and traditions;
al-Ghurayf,al-Ijtihad wal-Fatwa (Beirut,1978),9.
(3)For the role of al-Tusi in
the formulation of Imamite ijtihad, see Mahmud
Ramyar,Shaykh Tusi, Ph.D. thesis
(Edinburgh,1977),88-92.
(5)al-Khumayni, al-Hukuma
al-Islamiyya, (Beirut,1978),48.
(6)al-`Amili, al-Wasa段l,
XVIII,101; Bihar, LIII,181; al-Khumayni, op.
cit.,77.
(7)al-Tabarsi, al-Ihtijaj,
II,. 263-4; al-`Amili,al-Wasa段l, XVIII,94-5.
(8)al-Tabarsi, al-Ihtijaj,
II,260.
(9)al-Muhaqqiq
al-Hilli,al-Mu'tabar,298.
(10)al-Muhaqqiq al-Hilli,
al-Mu`tabar,298.
(11)al-Fusul al-Mukhtara,261.
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